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Governance strengthening programs such as the RAMSI in 
Solomon Islands and CRP in Vanuatu have achieved major 
overhauls of public service institutions, but the responses in 
terms of economic growth and human welfare indicators have 
been poor. Growth prospects post-RAMSI in Solomon Islands 
and post-CRP in Vanuatu are hindered because they are still 
high-cost economic environments for foreign investors.
The Governance for Growth (GfG) program 
in Vanuatu is the next stage in AusAID’s 
post-governance reforms. The focus in 
GfG is on removing constraints to growth 
in rural areas, and this is more likely 
than previous programs to yield returns 
in growth in rural and urban areas. The 
GfG program produced a great result by 
reforming the telecommunications sector 
and bringing Digicel into Vanuatu. GfG 
is now looking at electricity and transport 
in the country—some of the highest-cost 
services in the world.
Solomon Islands will not see an 
improvement in growth until it moves into 
a post-RAMSI stage and reduces the costs 
of doing business, as Vanuatu is hopefully 
doing. Expect the next few Solomon Islands’ 
economic surveys to look like the post-CRP 
surveys in Vanuatu: ‘We’ve had the RAMSI 
reforms, so where is the growth?’
The economies of Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu have rebounded well from 
the crises in the early 2000s. Growth rates 
in gross domestic product (GDP) have 
been high enough that real GDP per capita 
has gone past the pre-crisis levels in each 
country (Figure 1). This is a considerable 
achievement, given the disorder that 
occurred.
Are these two countries likely to see 
these rates of growth of real GDP per capita 
continue? The view expressed in AusAID’s 
(2006) Pacific 2020:2 report was that ‘[e]
conomic growth will not be sufficient to solve 
all problems facing these countries, but it is 
necessary. No country has succeeded in reduc-
ing poverty without it.’
To overcome the economic, social and po-
litical challenges facing Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, the countries must create a future 
with sustained real GDP growth per capita.
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2008) predicts growth rates in both countries 
to slow in the near to medium term. The 
IMF predicts that annual real growth rates 
in Solomon Islands will fall from 4.2 per cent 
in 2008 to 2.8 per cent in 2009 and to 1.7 per 
cent in 2013. Likewise, the IMF predicts that 
annual real growth rates in Vanuatu will 
fall from 4 per cent in 2008 to 3.5 per cent 
in 2009 and to 2.5 per cent in 2013. Given 
that population growth projections for both 
countries (World Bank 2008c; IMF 2008) 
are about 2.5 per cent, real GDP growth 
per capita is predicted by the IMF to start 
falling in Solomon Islands and to stagnate 
in Vanuatu by 2013.
It is of interest to compare the predictions 
for Solomon Islands and Vanuatu with the 
prediction for Vietnam. For the Pacific island 
countries, the high current real growth rates 
are expected to fall back to, remain at or fall 
below population growth rates, while the 
IMF’s predictions for real rates of growth 
for Vietnam are 7.3 per cent in 2008, 7.3 per 
cent in 2009 and 8 per cent in 2013. Vietnam 
is predicted to take off like the East Asian 
‘tiger’ economies did in the past. Why does 
the IMF predict such different futures for 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu? Why does 
the prediction for Vietnamese growth seem 
as inevitable as the prediction for Pacific 
stagnation?
It is the aim of this survey to draw out 
some of the differences in the countries 
that are likely to create this divergence 
of future paths. Unfortunately, given the 
circumstances in Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, the IMF forecasts look to be realistic 
guesses. The high real per capita growth 
rates required by Pacific 2020 (AusAID 2006) 
are unlikely without continued structural 
reforms, and such reforms will be politically 
and economically costly.
Figure 1 Forecasted per capita real GDP on a purchasing power parity basis
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Macroeconomic stability
Overall, the fiscal and monetary policies of 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have been 
sensibly managed and their administrations 
and public services deserve credit for the 
continued restraint exercised. Some signs, 
however, are appearing that point to underlying 
imbalances in the two economies.
The central banks of both countries have 
managed to keep inflation under control 
(Figure 2). In recent years, Solomon Islands’ 
inflation rate has been brought down to the 
median level for emerging and developing 
economies, while the inflation rate in Vanuatu 
has been brought down to the median level 
for advanced economies. Inflation rates 
have turned upwards in 2008 due to the 
pressure of higher oil and food prices, but 
both countries have succeeded in keeping 
inflation rates within levels experienced in 
other countries.
There is a need, however, to keep an eye 
on inflation in the short term as the recent 
increases in global food and fuel prices 
have not been fully absorbed. Fortunately, 
there has been no suggestion of using the 
government budget to subsidise fuel or 
food prices, which would be unwise even 
if there were sufficient revenue. In Solomon 
Islands, inflation in the last quarter of 2007 
and the first quarter of 2008 remained high, 
at 10 per cent and 9.7 per cent, respectively 
(CBSI 2008a). In July 2008, the Central Bank 
of Solomon Islands (CBSI 2008c) released 
a warning that the May 2008 inflation rate 
had risen to 13.1 per cent in annual terms. 
In Vanuatu, the June 2008 quarterly figures 
(RBV 2008) showed a consumer price index 
(CPI) increase of 1.5 per cent. In annual 
terms, this would be equivalent to the 
highest rate of inflation since the 1980s.
Government budget deficits have been 
low, with both countries recording budget 
surpluses in the years up to 2007. Both, 
Figure 2 Comparative inflation rates, 1996–2008
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however, had small budget deficits in 2007. 
External debt levels have been lowered in 
both countries, but government expenditure 
has risen very quickly in the past few years 
as spending has been ramped up with rising 
government revenue and a perceived need 
to rebuild after the crises. There is, however, 
a need to urge caution about the rising levels 
of expenditure.
From 2003 to 2006, government 
expenditure rose by 66 per cent in Solomon 
Islands in Solomon Islands-dollar terms, 
or from 21 per cent to 32 per cent of GDP 
(CBSI various years; ADB 2008). From 2004 
to 2007, Vanuatu government expenditure 
rose by 50 per cent in vatu terms, or from 
21 per cent to 29 per cent of GDP (RBV 
2007). The recent rapid rate of expenditure 
increase has outstripped that of revenue, so 
both countries have moved from a surplus 
into a deficit budget position (Figure 3, for 
Vanuatu). A concern is that if economic 
growth slows, expenditure growth will 
likewise have to be scaled back.
The budget position of the Solomon 
Islands government is particularly 
vulnerable to changes in the revenue 
stream from logging. As discussed below, 
the revenue stream from logging is most 
likely a short-term windfall, as logging is 
occurring at above-replacement rates. Even 
a short-term problem in logging revenue has 
a major impact on government revenue.
According to the CBSI (2008c), the 
export duty from logs fell by SI$16.6 million 
in June 2008 during a dispute with logging 
companies over the export price. This fall 
represented approximately 15 per cent of the 
entire monthly revenue for the government. 
Only a strong increase in company taxes 
prevented the logging dispute leading to a 
decline in total revenue. A more permanent 
Figure 3 Fiscal policy in Vanuatu
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change in the logging revenue stream would 
put the Solomon Islands government under 
severe pressure.
A lingering concern about the Vanuatu 
budget is the low level of development 
expenditure. Development expenditure fell 
from 2.5 billion vatu in 2000 to 0.41 billion 
vatu in 2004. Development expenditure 
has recovered a little in recent budgets to a 
figure of 0.9 billion vatu in 2007 (Figure 4).
Recent economic surveys of Vanuatu 
(Sugden and Tevi 2004; Henckel 2006) 
pointed to this potential problem, and the 
Asian Development Bank’s Outlook (ADB 
2008:258) entry for Vanuatu mentioned that 
the rise in civil service salaries had ‘limited 
ministries’ ability to buy goods and services 
for public service delivery’. It is uncertain 
how much of this slashing of development 
expenditure is real and how much might be 
a result of a change in bookkeeping.
The current account balances for both 
countries have taken a sharp downturn 
in recent years. The IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook (2008) forecasts a –27.4 per cent 
current account deficit in 2008 for Solomon 
Islands, viewed as a percentage of GDP, after 
a –40 per cent current account balance in 
2007. The current account deficit in Vanuatu 
is predicted to be –13.7 per cent of GDP for 
2008.
No doubt, some of this borrowing is 
warranted for the economic rebuilding 
after the crisis years, however, the size of 
these deficits is extraordinary. Little of this 
increase in borrowing can be linked to an 
increase in private foreign investment in 
the two countries.
The deepening current account 
deficits could be a result of the high levels 
Figure 4 Current account balances and aid flows
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of current and planned development 
assistance that the two countries are 
receiving. Official development assistance 
in Solomon Islands grew from US$21 
million in 2000 to US$179 million in 2006 
(OECD Development Assistance Committee 
Database: http://webnet.oecd.org/wbos/
index.aspx). AusAID (http://www.ausaid.
gov.au/country/) estimates that total 
official development assistance to Solomon 
Islands will be more than US$200 million 
(A$236 million) in 2008–09. For Vanuatu, 
official development assistance rose from 
US$28 million in 2000 to US$41 million in 
2006, and is predicted by AusAID to rise to 
more than US$45 million (A$52 million) in 
2008–09.
These aid flows represent a considerable 
amount of money for small Pacific island 
nations. The 2008–09 estimates for official 
development assistance would constitute 
more than 50 per cent of GDP for Solomon 
Islands. For Vanuatu, the 2008–09 assistance 
levels represent 10 per cent of GDP. In 
per capita terms, aid to Solomon Islands 
is predicted to be more than A$380 per 
capita and for Vanuatu it is predicted to be 
A$220 per capita. In comparison, Vietnam, 
which has lower real GDP per capita than 
Vanuatu, receives about A$20 per capita 
in aid.
There has to be concern about the 
distorting effects of these large flows 
of foreign dollars on the allocation of 
resources in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
The large flows probably increase real 
exchange rates and lower the real returns 
to exporters, such as farmers. In some 
Figure 5 Governance in Solomon Islands
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sense, the two economies are fortunate 
that so much of this aid will be immediately 
cycled back to the donor countries as salaries 
and purchases of imports. The distortion 
of resource allocation is not as large as if 
the foreign aid were purchasing domestic 
resources.
Governance and politics
Most of the governance indicators for 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have taken 
a disappointing turn in recent years. The 
World Bank’s Governance Matters database 
(Kaufmann et al. 2008) shows various 
measures of governance (Figures 5 and 6).
It was one of the aims of the CRP in 
Vanuatu, begun in 1997, and the RAMSI 
program in Solomon Islands, begun in 
2003, to improve governance and capability 
within the public service. The World Bank’s 
governance indicators suggest that these 
programs have had little long-term success 
in improving the public service.
If the CRP and RAMSI were effective, 
we would expect to see improvements in the 
measures of public service and governance, 
such as ‘government effectiveness’, 
‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’ and 
‘control of corruption’. It appears that 
public service capability was brought back 
to pre-crisis levels by 2005—perhaps in part 
due to the CRP and RAMSI—but we do not 
see much further improvement from 2005 
to 2007. The sole exceptions appear to be 
the rule of law and control of corruption 
measures in Vanuatu, which do appear to 
have improved compared with pre-crisis 
levels. Progress in most other measures, 
Figure 6 Governance in Vanuatu
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however, appears to have halted, and, in 
some cases—such as control of corruption 
in Solomon Islands and regulatory quality 
in Vanuatu—has gone backwards.
We might also expect that public sector 
reform, such as both countries underwent 
as part of the CRP and RAMSI, would have 
resulted in a streamlining of procedures 
and regulations. It was hoped that such 
streamlining would encourage foreign 
investment and trade. The evidence of such 
reforms would then be apparent in surveys 
such as the World Bank’s Doing Business.
If we look at the Doing Business indicators, 
however—available from 2005 in Vanuatu 
and 2006 in Solomon Islands—there is 
no evidence that the CRP or RAMSI have 
improved the regulatory environment for 
business. The regulatory environment in 
both countries could even have declined 
in absolute terms in the past few years; 
certainly, we can say that other countries 
have been reforming and Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu have fallen behind other 
countries in relative terms. On the overall 
index, the ‘ease of doing business’, Solomon 
Islands fell from fifty-third of 155 countries 
in 2006 to seventy-ninth of 178 countries in 
2008 (a higher rank indicates a more difficult 
business environment). On the overall 
index, Vanuatu fell from forty-ninth in 2006 
to sixty-second in 2008. This decline is not 
due simply to the two countries standing 
still while other countries reform (although 
this is true to some extent); on some 
measures, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
have done worse recently.
Doing Business reports on the number of 
procedures and the expected length of time 
in days to accomplish typical business tasks. 
The World Bank found that the number of 
procedures to start a business in Solomon 
Islands rose from five in 2006 to seven in 2008, 
while the number of days required rose from 
35 to 57. Likewise, the World Bank found 
that the number of procedures to register 
property in Solomon Islands rose from six 
in 2006 to 10 in 2008, while the number of 
days required rose from 86 to 297.
For Vanuatu, the numbers are more 
mixed for changes between 2006 and 2008. 
The number of days required for ‘dealing 
with licences’ fell from 82 in 2006 to 51 in 
2008, but the ‘time for export’ and ‘time for 
import’, representing delays in days for 
international trade, rose from seven and 
nine, respectively, in 2006 to 26 and 30, 
respectively, in 2008.
The comparison country of Vietnam—
ninety-ninth of 178 in 2008—was ranked 
worse than Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
Judging by the different growth predictions 
from the IMF for Vietnam and the Pacific 
island countries, a better Doing Business 
rank is not a sure determinant of success. 
While these numbers might or might not be 
good predictors of economic success, they 
suggest that regulatory reform has stalled 
in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—just as 
governance reform has stalled.
If governance and regulatory reforms 
have stalled, a concern is that the long-term 
political and economic problems that led 
to the crisis in Solomon Islands will lead to 
another internal conflict in the future. The 
militias have been disarmed and RAMSI 
has been very successful as a peace-keeping 
force (Glenn 2007). There is, however, a 
high degree of income inequality between 
urban and rural areas (SISO 2007). The 
island of Malaita, home to 140,000 of the 
total Solomon Islands population of 533,000 
(SISO 2007), is not receiving the levels of 
development assistance or new projects that 
are going to Guadalcanal. The development 
and operation of the Gold Ridge gold-mine 
on Guadalcanal is likely to reopen these 
issues in the future.
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 number 3 2008 © the australian national university
9
Economic survey
Pacific Economic BullEtin
The current boom in tourism and 
timber
Two sectors have been of particular 
importance in the recovery of both countries: 
timber in Solomon Islands and tourism in 
Vanuatu—and partly also in Solomon 
Islands. These sectors, however, face their 
own limits to growth, which will probably 
vindicate the predictions of the IMF. 
The tourism sectors in both countries 
have experienced a strong recovery after a 
dip during the crises. Some of this increase 
might the result of relative good fortune, 
due to rising perceptions of risk in other 
Asia Pacific vacation destinations such as 
Bali and Fiji. Some of the increase in tourist 
numbers is due to reforms such as opening 
up international air traffic into Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu.
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are 
signatories of the 2003 Pacific Islands Air 
Service Agreement under the Pacific Islands 
Forum. The loosening of controls on flights 
into both countries has resulted in some new 
services being introduced by Pacific carriers. 
Air Pacific started a service to Solomon 
Islands, while Pacific Blue, Air New Zealand 
and Solomon Airlines are running services 
to Vanuatu.
From 2003 to 2008, tourist arrivals rose 
by 50 per cent in Solomon Islands and 60 
per cent in Vanuatu. Total visitor arrivals 
in Solomon Islands rose from 7,372 in 2003 
to 15,169 in 2007 (CBSI 2008b). Arrivals in 
Vanuatu by air rose from 50,400 in 2003 to 
81,345 in 2007 (RBV 2008) and, up to June 
2008, the number of arrivals by air to Vanuatu 
was higher than for the same period in 2007. 
Despite a dip in 2004, cruise ship arrivals in 
Vanuatu saw a similar increase—from 50,430 
in 2003 to about 85,000 arrivals a year in 2006 
and 2007. Up to the middle of 2008, cruise 
ship arrivals in Vanuatu held steady at the 
numbers for 2006 and 2007.
While these tourist numbers are good 
news for both countries, tourism remains 
a niche sector. Overseas name recognition 
for Solomon Islands and Vanuatu as Pacific 
vacation destinations is limited. Fiji is 
already aggressively marketing low-cost 
resort vacations and it is bound to recover 
politically at some point. It remains to 
be seen whether the tourist numbers in 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu will fall back 
again if Fiji can regain the momentum in 
tourism that it had before the 2006 coup.
As has been commented on by Gay 
(2004), the high costs of services and 
transportation within both countries will 
keep their resorts small and prevent rapid 
expansion. As high-cost tourism operators, 
resorts in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
will be able to attract only the niche tourists, 
such as divers and eco-tourists. Operations 
that cater to such tourists will not be able to 
provide the large numbers of formal-sector 
jobs that the countries need to produce 
continued rapid growth.
In Solomon Islands, the timber industry 
has been a large factor in the country’s recent 
economic success. Timbers exports made up 
73 per cent of total exports in 2006 and 67 per 
cent in 2007, and 24 per cent of GDP in 2006 
and 27 per cent in 2007 (ADB 2008). If the 
value of timber exports is subtracted from 
GDP, non-timber GDP grew more slowly 
than the inflation rate in 2006 and 2007; so 
the value of real GDP outside timber exports 
has not grown. It could be said therefore 
that the current economic boom in Solomon 
Islands is simply a timber boom.
This timber boom cannot be sustained. 
The current rate of logging is far above 
the natural replacement rate, as non-
governmental organisations have been 
warning for some time now. The CBSI 
(2007:17) warned in its 2007 Annual Report 
that ‘the current rate of log extraction is 
completely unsustainable. According to 
a study by the Forestry Department, the 
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industry is expected to slow down after 
2012; however the decline is now expected 
to start as soon as 2010 given the huge 
increase in extraction in the past couple of 
years.’
The ADB (2008b) warns of a decline in 
logging rates after 2009 and a depletion of 
forests by 2013. Despite these clear warnings 
from the central bank and the ADB, logging 
rates increased in the first half of 2008 above 
the rates for 2007. Timber exports climbed 
from about 500,000 cubic metres in 2000–02 
to about 1.1 million cubic metres in 2004–06, 
and then rose sharply in 2007 to more than 
1.4 million cubic metres. In May 2008, before 
the recent price dispute, monthly timber 
exports were 171,475 cubic metres (CBSI 
2008d:4), equivalent to a rate of more than 
2 million cubic metres annually.
It seems likely that the end of Solomon 
Islands’ timber boom is fast approaching—
whether in 2010 or some short time later. The 
recent sharp fall in timber export revenue 
due to the price dispute and the impact this 
fall had on the government’s revenue base 
should be a warning of what is to come. 
When Solomon Islands’ timber industry 
collapses, the government will have to find 
a way to make up for the loss of 15–20 per 
cent of total tax revenue.
A sensible course for Solomon Islands 
to steer would be to curtail logging rates 
sharply and to induce loggers to move 
towards sustainable and plantation logging, 
as set out rather optimistically in the 
AusAID Pacific 2020 report (2006). This 
would require an enormous expansion of 
the plantation-timber area. Of the harvested 
timber volume in 2007, 93 per cent was 
from natural forests, while only 7 per cent 
was from plantations (CBSI 2007). Solomon 
Islands is a very long way from having a 
sustainable timber industry.
What are the real constraints to 
economic growth?
If tourism and timber are not going 
to deliver the rapid growth needed to 
turn Solomon Islands and Vanuatu into 
a Vietnam, what will? In the 2006 Pacific 
Economic Bulletin survey for Vanuatu, Timo 
Henckel (2006:2) hoped that policymakers 
would pursue bold reforms so that ‘Vanuatu 
does not wake up every morning on 
“Groundhog Day” when nothing has 
changed and yesterday’s problems are still 
today’s problems’.
Reforms need to focus on the key factors 
that are making the predicted future for 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu different 
from the predicted future for Vietnam. 
Vietnam is ranked worse than Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu on the Doing Business 
standings, yet Vietnam is predicted to grow 
strongly in the near and long term, whereas 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are predicted 
to stagnate. Governance does not therefore 
appear to be the ‘binding constraint’ to 
growth, in the sense of the term developed 
by Hausmann et al. (2005). So what are the 
binding constraints?
The analysis of Hausmann et al. would 
suggest that the binding constraints in the 
Pacific are the ones that have been identified 
in many studies, such as the ADB’s (2005) 
private-sector assessment of Solomon 
Islands or AusAID’s Pacific 2020 (2006) 
assessment for the entire Pacific. Apart 
from poor governance and weak property 
rights, these constraints are low-quality and 
expensive infrastructure and low-quality 
and high-cost labour.
So, have the bold reforms been taken 
that will avoid Henckel’s ‘Groundhog Day’ 
vision? In most cases, these reforms have not 
taken place; but there is one bright counter-
example: mobile telecommunications.
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Telecommunications
Reform in the mobile telecommunications 
sector is one of the best stories to come 
out of the Pacific in the past decade. The 
performance of the telecommunications 
sector in Samoa, Papua New Guinea and, 
lately Vanuatu is a story that should give a 
measure of hope for the rest of the Pacific. 
Hopefully, these examples will spur mobile 
telecommunications reform in Solomon 
Islands.
In the AusAID Pacific 2020 (2006:3) 
report, a desperate note seemed to enter the 
discussion: ‘the Pacific island region seems 
to be missing the mobile telecommunications 
revolution that is sweeping much of the 
developing world, bringing large benefits 
to producers and customers alike’.
In Samoa, the opening up of the mobile 
phone market in 2005 saw the number of 
subscribers rise from 1.5 per 100 people in 
2002 to 46 per 100 in 2007 (ITU 2007). There 
is evidence that the cost of mobile phone 
calls also fell after the opening up of the 
market (AusAID 2008).
The Irish mobile phone company Digicel 
was granted operating rights in Papua New 
Guinea on 20 July 2007. The growth in the 
mobile phone sector since the introduction 
of Digicel into the PNG market has been 
so strong that the Treasury’s 2008 mid-
year report (Papua New Guinea Treasury 
2008:3) only a year later explains an upward 
revision of economic growth as being due 
to several factors, the first of which is the 
expansion of mobile phone services.
The same explosive  growth in 
mobile phone services occurred in Papua 
New Guinea after the introduction of 
competition. In 2002, there were only 0.3 
mobile subscribers per 100 people in Papua 
New Guinea. This number increased to 4.7 
subscribers per 100 people in 2007 (ITU 
2007), and the Treasury estimated that this 
had increased to 17 subscribers per 100 
people by mid 2008 (Papua New Guinea 
Treasury 2008). At the same time, Treasury 
estimated that the price of mobile phone 
calls fell by 50 per cent from mid 2007—
when Digicel entered the market—to 2008.
Digicel launched in Vanuatu on 25 June 
2008. While numbers are difficult to gather on 
the success of the Digicel venture, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Digicel penetration 
into the Vanuatu market has been as large 
as in Papua New Guinea. Mobile phone 
subscriptions were already rising before 
deregulation, from 2.4 subscribers per 100 
people in 2002 to 11.5 per 100 people in 2007 
(ITU 2007). Digicel claims to have invested 
US$35 million in its mobile network there 
(Cellular News 2008). The potential exists 
in Vanuatu for a mobile phone penetration 
level similar to that in Samoa.
There have been several attempts to 
calculate the economic and social welfare 
benefits of increasing mobile phone 
penetration. These efforts are further ahead 
in Africa, such as Souter et al. (2005), a UK 
Department for International Development 
project. A very interesting project is being 
conducted by the Pacific Institute of Public 
Policy (PIPP 2008) to study how mobile 
phones are being used in rural areas in 
Vanuatu.
Solomon Islands currently has mobile 
phone subscription rates below the 
pre-deregulation levels of Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu. While the number 
of subscribers has risen from 0.2 per 100 
people in 2002 to 2.2 per 100 people in 
2007, this level is significantly below that 
of its neighbours. The same potential for 
change in the mobile phone market exists 
in Solomon Islands.
One lesson suggests  i tself  in a 
comparison of deregulation in Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu. In Papua New 
Guinea, the incumbent, Telikom, was not 
compelled to allow the new entrants access 
across telecommunications networks. In 
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Vanuatu, cross-network access was part of 
the deregulation. In Papua New Guinea, 
many users carried two mobiles: a Telikom 
mobile to make phone calls to landlines 
and connections in the urban areas and a 
Digicel mobile to phone their wantoks in 
the villages. In Vanuatu, users generally 
have only one mobile phone. Obviously, 
cross-network access should be part of any 
telecommunications deregulation.
Water and electricity infrastructure
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have some of 
the highest charges for electricity (AusAID 
2007) and the lowest rates of extension 
to rural areas (Cox et al. 2007). In both 
countries, water and sewerage services exist 
only for those in the major urban areas. The 
water authority in Solomon Islands has a 
very poor governance record, while the 
French utility UNELCO in Vanuatu appears 
to have been essentially unmonitored by the 
Vanuatu government. A report by Castalia 
Strategic Advisors (2004) on infrastructure 
regulation in Vanuatu reported complaints 
that the government units responsible 
for supervising UNELCO lacked the 
accounting and legal expertise to supervise 
the concession contract.
In Vanuatu, the AusAID program 
GfG, which was involved in the mobile 
telecommunications deregulation, is 
currently assisting the government to 
create an independent utility regulator. One 
of the first tasks of the regulator will be to 
look at electricity and water charges to see 
if the high prices are warranted. The GfG 
program is also looking for opportunities to 
open up the electricity and water markets in 
Vanuatu. Its options are, however, restricted 
by the very long-term monopoly licences 
granted to Union Electric du Vanuatu 
Limited (UNELCO).
Shipping into and out of Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu
The World Bank’s Doing Business (2008b) 
rates the Vanuatu wharves as one of the most 
expensive places in the world to undertake 
exporting and importing. The cost to import 
a container at Port Vila is US$2,225—3.5 
times as expensive as in Papua New Guinea 
and six times as expensive as the cheapest 
country in the world, Singapore. Similarly, 
exporting a container out of Port Vila costs 
US$1,815—3.1 times as expensive as Papua 
New Guinea and 4.4 times as expensive as 
Singapore.
In the individual country report for 
Vanuatu (World Bank 2008b), the World 
Bank reports the breakdown of the ‘cost to 
import’ and the ‘cost to export’. Ports and 
terminal handling charges constituted 17 
of the 26 days of the delay to export and 
US$1,150 of the US$1,815 cost to export. 
Ports and handling charges constituted 17 
of the 30 days’ delay to import and US$1,150 
of the $2,225 cost to import.
In comparison, ports and terminal 
handling charges account for three days’ 
delay and US$174 of the cost of exporting 
in Papua New Guinea. In Vietnam, ports 
and terminal handling charges account for 
three days’ delay and US$369 of the cost of 
exporting.
Is the story as bad as the World Bank 
presents? While there had been criticisms 
of the Doing Business methodology, the high 
charges at the Port Vila and Santo wharves 
were also noted in the ADB’s shipping study 
(2007). Based on Vanuatu Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Management data from 2003, 
the ADB estimated that stevedoring charges 
at Port Vila and Santo were seven times more 
expensive than at Port Moresby.
High costs of importing and exporting 
are a tax on the rest of the Vanuatu economy. 
While the political situation in Port Vila 
makes it difficult to change the management 
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or practices at the wharf there, the rest of 
Vanuatu should be reminded of the price it 
pays for the poor management at the docks.
One would assume that in countries 
made up of hundreds of small islands, inter-
island shipping would be a principal concern 
of the central government. A country without 
internal communications and transportation 
is not truly a country at all, but a collection 
of separated communities. Sadly, however, 
a ‘collection of separated communities’ is a 
reasonably accurate description of Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu. Internal transportation 
between the islands is currently difficult 
and costly for residents outside the capital 
cities. Without adequate transportation, 
other reform initiatives would appear to 
be a waste of resources: why spend money 
on agricultural outreach programs to areas 
where farmers have no opportunity to get 
their produce to markets?
There have been some initiatives to 
improve the inter-island transport situation, 
such as the ADB’s (2007) Solomon Islands 
inter-island shipping report. This initiative 
followed on the heels of EU studies in 
Solomon Islands in 1999 and 2007. The 
ADB also developed several ideas for wharf 
construction and improvements in its outer 
islands infrastructure project in Vanuatu in 
1999. Despite the many studies, nothing 
concrete appears to have been done.
There appears to be little domestic 
political interest in doing anything about 
the state of inter-island shipping in 
either country, and this is most likely the 
principal problem. The GfG program in 
Vanuatu is, however, looking at inter-island 
infrastructure, which could be a positive 
sign for the future.
Banking
In the banking sector, the development 
banks and national provident funds in 
both countries have followed similar 
paths, familiar to those with experience 
in the Pacific. The development bank 
in Vanuatu was closed, but a worrying 
recent development was the possibility of 
it reopening. The current suggestion is to 
re-establish the development bank under 
the Department of Finance and Economic 
Management. It would be a far better idea 
not to pursue a development bank at all; 
but, if it is politically impossible to avoid, 
the development bank should be placed 
under the supervision of the Reserve Bank 
of Vanuatu.
On a positive note, a branch of the 
French bank BRED was opened in Port 
Vila. While this will have little impact on 
the provision of banking services outside 
urban areas, it is hoped that its entry will 
bring a greater level of competition to urban 
banking services. Twenty per cent or less of 
the population in both countries, however, 
lives in the urban areas serviced by banks. 
The majority of the populations have little 
or no access to banking services. This 
makes even simple processes such as cash 
transfers very expensive, which will become 
increasingly obvious if Australia and New 
Zealand move ahead with programs to 
import temporary labour from the Pacific 
and the remittance flows increase.
What is needed is a ‘Digicel’ of the 
banking world to find an innovative way 
to move banking services out into rural and 
remote communities. As with mobile phones, 
the expansion of these services to rural 
communities would be a tangible benefit 
in the daily lives of all of the population. 
One possibility is for banking services to 
piggy-back on the expansion of mobile 
phone coverage, as is already happening in 
Africa and Asia (‘On the frontier of finance’, 
15 November 2007, Economist). We do not 
know yet what form such banking services 
would take, but it is essential that banking 
regulations be relatively open to innovative 
answers coming from new companies. Just 
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as Telikom is fighting a fierce battle to scale 
back telecommunications reform in Papua 
New Guinea, existing banks will lobby 
hard to keep the banking services market 
closed.
Education
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have 
made impressive strides in enrolling 
children in primary schools. Although the 
quality of the schooling might be questioned 
(and the reliability of Pacific education 
data are always in question), more than 90 
per cent of children are enroled in primary 
school. The breakdown in schooling seems 
to be occurring at the secondary level: only 
32 per cent of males and 27 per cent of 
females are enrolled in secondary schooling 
in Solomon Islands. For Vanuatu, the 
enrollment rate is slightly higher at 44 per 
cent of males and 38 per cent of females. In 
Vietnam, meanwhile, 77 per cent of males 
and 75 per cent of females are enrolled in 
secondary education.
Why, then, do parents not continue 
the education of their children in an 
environment such as the Pacific, where 
the lack of educated labour is a common 
explanation for the high costs of business? 
Why are secondary school enrolments 
one-half to one-third of primary school 
enrolments?
The low enrolment figures in Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu must be due to a 
perceived lack of return on that education, 
compared with Vietnam. The small scale 
of the formal sectors in Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu and the lack of opportunity 
for the use of higher qualifications outside 
the formal sector probably explain the lack 
of supply of skilled labour. The most likely 
explanation would be that the parents of 
children in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and 
Vietnam share the predictions of the IMF 
about the future of each country.
Aid and development: is there 
another model?
Recent aid efforts in Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu have tended to be either 
project related, such as the US Millennium 
Challenge Corporation program in Vanuatu, 
or governance programs such as current 
versions of RAMSI in Solomon Islands 
and the CRP in Vanuatu. There have been 
problems with both.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) has allocated US$66 million to 
spend on infrastructure projects in Vanuatu 
between 2006 and 2011. The projects 
funded are road improvements in the 
islands of Efate and Santo. These islands 
are a seemingly odd choice for a program 
that aims to reduce poverty. The two most 
remote provinces of Torba and Tafea are 
also the provinces that contain the highest 
rates of poverty (Vanuatu National Statistics 
Office 2008). These are also the most isolated 
provinces due to the lack of reliable inter-
island shipping. Instead of developing 
projects to improve infrastructure in the 
poorest provinces, the MCC is funding road 
projects on the two islands that contain the 
two urban areas, with the lowest levels of 
poverty and the highest levels of existing 
infrastructure in Vanuatu.
Funding programs on the richer islands 
while allowing development to languish in 
the poorer islands only worsens the inter-
island disparities that currently exist in 
both countries. These disparities—and the 
resulting migration and rivalry—are the 
root cause of the ethnic problems that flared 
in Solomon Islands. The MCC program does 
not seem to have a full understanding of the 
conditions into which it is delivering aid to 
Vanuatu.
The governance-building efforts such 
as CRP and RAMSI have a very different 
application but have probably worsened 
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the same problem in Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. The governance programs have 
succeeded in restoring governance to the 
levels that existed in the mid 1990s, but 
they have not greatly improved governance 
beyond that. A cynical interpretation might 
be that the levels of governance in the mid 
1990s were those that the economic élite 
wished for, so certain domestic interest 
groups do not want higher levels of 
governance.
The governance reforms have not 
succeeded in creating broad-based, long-
term rates of real GDP growth in Solomon 
Islands or Vanuatu, such as those predicted 
for Vietnam. This is because governance 
problems are not the binding constraint in 
either country. Governance reforms might be 
worthwhile even if they do not lead to real 
growth, in the sense that a population might 
prefer a better functioning government; 
however, a well-run finance ministry or a 
competent central bank does not make up 
for expensive or non-existent transport and 
other services from the point of view of a 
subsistence farmer considering whether 
to produce excess agricultural output or 
a foreign investor considering whether to 
build a new tourist resort.
While governance programs have not 
produced a long-term return in terms of 
improved governance or higher economic 
growth, they have poured aid resources into 
Honiara and Port Vila. Pouring resources 
into the richer islands of Guadalcanal and 
Efate is only worsening the inter-island 
disparities in income and opportunity, while 
doing nothing to address the development 
of the outlying and poorer islands.
The GfG program in Vanuatu is a new 
type of development program and one that 
might be a better model than some of the 
previous ones. AusAID has funded GfG 
with a projected budget of A$50 million. 
The purpose of the GfG program is to 
identify and correct obstacles to growth in 
rural communities. So far, the GfG program 
has had one major success with the mobile 
telecommunications reform and has also 
assisted the effort to open up air travel into 
Vanuatu. The GfG program is now looking 
to reform the electricity and water markets, 
inter-island transportation and the always-
political commodity marketing board. There 
are other areas that GfG should look into, 
such as the high charges at the Port Vila 
wharf.
Governance reforms and project aid 
can lead to some improvements in the 
conditions in countries, but they can often 
also lead to misallocation of resources. 
Deregulation efforts have already scored 
several big successes. If one were to consider 
the ‘value per $1 of aid’, the deregulation 
efforts of the GfG in air transport and mobile 
communications would easily be the best 
value for money for the people of Vanuatu, 
while the continued support for reform in 
the public service would appear to have 
almost no return at all.
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